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FORcmLE SELF·HELP
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Professor Richard B. Lillich
My joh today is to fill you in on
some of the problems about the use of
force that are not directly taken up hy a
disl'ussion of tIll' ~eneral prohlem of
contliet managelllent. As you sec from
the introduction on the lecture, I am to
talk about such things as forcible !'I'lfhelp to protect nationals, hUlllanitarian
intervention, reprisals, retorsion, and
similar doctrine!'. As Professor rvloore
undouhtedly pointed out yesterday, the
general view is that the. United Nations
Charter permits the use of force in two
areas. One of these is individual or
collective self-defense, and the second is
the implementation of a decision by a
competent international organization.
This generally, of course, would he the
United Nations, hut in sonh~ instances it
might be a regional organization such as
the Organization of American States.
Professor l,issitzyn lws this to say in
his book, /Ilt('matiollal Lalli Toefl/.Y alief
'/'olllorrow, "tt is generally agreed that
these rl'strietions apply to all interstate

uses of force, whether they are called
war or force short of war." rn other
words, what 1'111 talking about today i"
covered in tlJ(~ same way that the actual
use of warfare would be covered. lIe
goes on to say that "forcible reprisals
I and IHI'sumahly other uses of
!'df-hdp I are appanmtly no IOllgl'r lawful." This quotation is an indication, of
course, that we international lawyers
like to avoid saying yes or no and would
generally prefer to say maybe. The
conclusion seemS to be that they are no
longer lawful. Therefore, what 1 want to
discuss today in rather pinpointed
fashion are four particular areas: retorsion, reprisal, the use of force to protect
nationals, and, finally, humanitarian intervention. Hopefully, we will first determine what their stand,ing was under
customary international law, and secondly, what impact, if a,ny, the United
Nations Charter' has IHld up'On this. The
inlen'sting fal~t' is tlwt, dl'spite the literature you read on the charter saying
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that force is restricted to the two
instances that r mentioned hefore, all of
these four doctrines are still dealt with
by international law. They are obviously
concepts that states deem to be necessary; at least they are invoked constantly in situations that technically, if you
apply the charter rigidly, would not be
deemed applicable.
I think here we have to realize that
the U.N. Charter was oribrinally interpreted as a rather absolutist document.
The idea was that force, and particularly
aggressive force, was to be eliminated.
Warfare was to be eliminated cxcept for
the two instances that I have pointed
out. But we are gradually beginning to
realize that certain other of the sanctions that were built into the United
Nations Charter, or were to be implemented through the United Nations
Charter, have not actually been implemented. The charter is not wholly effective. Thus, in certain areas we may want
to consider whether, in effect, some of
these previous precharter doctrines
could not be revised. For instance, in
Professor Falk's recent book, tef{al
Order in a Violent World, he IS wry
critical of American use of force in any
of these less-than-warfare situations. But
even he, in his hook and in a recent
article, has said that the elimination of
violence from international life is not an
absolute value. Nor is it separable from
other questions at issue in international
society. He points out that while the
United Nations Charter does legislate
against not only the use but also the
threat of force, it was also designed to
protect human rights and to establish
and create a viable world order. Both of
these are objectives which may require
the use of coercion in a given instance
to protect the overall objectives of the
charter. If this is a valid conclusion and
if the United Nations itself has not
implemcnted all the powers that arc
found in the charter, then I think onc
has to consider whcther or not sOllle of
these traditional doctrines still have

validity and, if so, whether we may
want to redefine them in certain ways.
The first of these foundations is
retorsion. I take this doctrine first because it is generally listed as number one
in all the legal literature, probably
because it can be disposed of most
rapidly. Retorsion consists of a legal but
unfriendly act taken with a retaliatory
or coercive purposc.* Generally, it does
not involve the use of force, but it may.
Now the emphasis here is upon doing
something unfriendly but legal. What
would an example of this he'?
Wcll, suppose, for instance, a country
tinkcrs around with its tariff rate to the
great detriment of- the United States,
The United States may respond hy
adopting a discriminatory tariff rate
against the other country. We have done
nothing illegal, we have just responded,
It is certainly an unfriendly act, but it
does not involve the use of force, The
idea is based on the old concept of an
eye for an eye. Weare adopting a
sanction equal to what was done against
us in the hope that the first nation will
relent on a quid pro quo basis. Unfortunately, it rarely operates that way, buL
this is the theory behind it.
Another example might be the discrimination situation. A country refuses
to let certain American goodR hI) illl'
ported. The UniLed 'States' might rc·
spond by revoking that country's privi.
lege, previously grantcd by thc Unitcd
StaLcs, of fishing within thc 12-mile
limit. Once again this is quite permissi·
blc, even though it may involve the use
of force if that country then sent fishing
boats within the particular area. This is
an example of retorsion which could
involve the use of force.
One of the retorsions that is of
primary eoneer~ now-and very topical
in respect to Peru, Bolivia, Chilc, and
other countries-is the reduction of
*Bruce Hilr)ow, "The U~e of Force
... Short of War," United Slates Navallnsti·
tute Proceedings, November 1966, p. 81).
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foreign aid or the termination of foreign
aid. We have a statute called the
Hickenlooper amendment which requires the President to cut off foreign
aid after 6 months if American property
is taken without payment of adequate
compensation. This, I would say, is an
act of retorsion.
Now I just want to emphasize in
ending this discussion of retorsion what
I said before. It involves a logal act,
something that is quite permissible and
quite unfriendly, hut which is not predicated upon a prior illegal act hy another
country such as self-defense is. You can
only respond by self-defense if the other
party has broken the provisions of the
United Nations Charter and engaged in
armed attack or otherwise committed
aggression. Then it is the prior illegal act
which makes your conduct legal. But in
this situation, of course, your conduct is
legal to start with. Because it is a legal
act, it is not affected hy the charter at
all, so therefore, what learning we have
on retorsion from before 1945 can be
carried over and applied to today as
well.
Now reprisals are a different matter.
This is an area where, with the exception of Commander Harlow's piece,
there has been very little writing recently, althouv;h r must say there was a very
useful article puhlished this past summer which I will refer to in the course
of my remarks. Now reprisals constitute
an action involving the u~e of force
against another state which has violated
international law. The idea of reprisal in
international law is not to punish the
first state for the particular illcgal act
hut to encourage il to conform to
international law.
Here you have a contrast with retorsion, which is a legal act from the
beginning. Reprisal is only legal in response to a prior illegal act by another
country. 'I'hcrtl arc also c('rtain limitations upon reprisal, at least under traditional international law. I'll give you
three of these. First of all, as I have said,

there must be an illegal acl by the other
foreign state. Secondly, the state that is
going to lake the reprisal must request
from the initial wrongdoing state some
kind of reparation-give them an opportunity, in effect, to make right their
international wrong. And then, thirdly,
and this limitation is something that
runs through the entire question of
self-help and, indeed, of self-defense,
the measures that must be adopted in
carrying out a reprisal must bc proportionate to the original provocation. In
,otlwr words, if some infiltrator COme'S
over your border and shoots one of
your sentries, you cannot A-bomb the
capital of the other cOlIntry.
Classical examples of reprisals, most
of which were in the area of naval
warfare, would involve an embargo of
the ships of an offending state, seizure
of ships on the high seas, and pacific
blockade. More reccntly it has been
suggested that the right of reprisal could
be invoked, and indeed to some extent
it was invoked, in the original response
in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 when
there was an airs trike at the oil installations immediately after the alleged
attack on the American ship.
Also, during last winter, just before
th release of the Pueblo crew, it was
suggested that seizure of a North
Korean fishing boat that had been huilt
in Europe and which was being towed
across the Atlantic could have h('(m
utilized as a form of reprisal. The
efficacy of that is something 1 will leave
to your speculation. In any event, it is a
live doctrine and, as 1 am sure you are
aware, it is one that the Israelis rely
upon almost every day. I have not had
the opportunity to see today's New
York Times, hut there was another
"retaliatory raid" announced in yesterday'sNew York Times.
This hrings us to the question of
what is the impact of th(l United Nations Charter upon this doctrine of
n'prisal'? Article 2(4) of the charter, as
Professor i\Ioore told you, prohihits the
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threat or the use of force. The question
is, does this really mean that a state,
even a state that is trying to follow the
dictatcs of the United Nations Charter,
must refrain from any use of forcc
whatsoevcr when another state is violating thc provisions of the charter and
when the United Nations either cannot
act or refuses to act in a given situation?
I must say that the general view which is
advanced by such people as Brownlie in
his book on this subject, by Commander
Harlow, by Professor Li:;sitzyn, and
most others is that the charter prohihits
all reprisals involving use of force. Professor Brierly in his book The Law of
Nations says,
today it is beyond argument that
armed reprisals •.. would be a
flagrant violation of international
law. Equally, it is also clear that
Article 2 does not preclude a state
from taking unilaterally economic
or other rcprisals not involving the
use of armed force in retaliation
for a breach of international law
by another state.
There is a lot of support for this, not
only among the textwriters, but also in
the United Nations itself. In 19M the
Security Council ccnsurI'cl Grcat Britain
for carrying out a reprisal against
Yemcn. This was allegedly in retaliation
for the Yemini support of guerrillas in
Aden. You recall that thc British wcre
having great difficulty in that former
colony at the time. This resolution
passed the United Nations Security
Council, nine votes to none, with two
abstentions, and it "condemns reprisals
as incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the United Nation:;." This
is a pretty general statement. It is not
only condemning a ~pecific action, as
the United Nations has done in many
instances with resped to I:.;raeli r!'lalia·
tory action~, but it i:; saying thaI rcpri.
sals themselves arc incolllpatihl(~ with
the purposes and prineiples of the

United Nations Charter. Many scholars
like Professor Falk go even beyond that.
They conclude that the charter prohibits all forms of forcible self-help
other than the exercise of self·defense
within article 51 of the charter.
This raises some questions about
which we may want to speculate. I am
not sure it points to many answers, but
at least you can see the problem. Today,
most retaliatory claims are made by
Israel, but they are made by other states
as well. Should we condemn 11 country
like Israel merely hy applying the conventionlll wisdom tlmt reprisals have
bcen outlawed by the United Nations
Chartcr and, thereforc, are no goodthat Israel is engaging in acts that would
have constituted reprisals and is thcrefore violating international law? What
alternatives are available to Isrllel? I
think it is proper to assume an unwillingness on the pllrt of at least certain
Arab governments to negotiate. Negotiations under the United Nations Charter
in this situation, as you know, arc
required by article 33. Cannot it be
read, cannot it be interpreted, that what
l:;rael is doing is, as I suggested before,
obviously taking actions tlmt she thinks
she has to take for her national security
but also, in a broader sense, highlighting
a defcct in the operlltion:; of the United
NlItions or perhaps in the maehirwry of
the United Nations? In other words, in a
broader context, cannot it be argued
that Israel is making, really, a plea for
the cooperative type of law enforcemen t that the charter originally
envisaged?
Professor Falk wrote his article to
which I referred in the American
Journal of International Law last July.
It is an analysis of the Beirut raid and its
rclation to the international law of
retaliatioli. You recall that this occurred
a litlle over a year ago. An EI AI plane
had I.lcen shot up in Greece, and as
retaliation, Israeli commandos in helicopters landed at the Beirul airport and
destroyed an the Arab planes that were
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there. Unfortunately, two-thirds of
those planes were not owned by anyone
in Arab countries-they were owned by
American businessmen. The Israelis thus
destroyed about some S33 million
worth of property, most of which was
subsequently compensated for by
Lloyds of London. In any event, Professor Falk goes through a very detailed
and, I think, quite correct analysis, but
he comes out saying that the raid seems
illegal, which is in contrast to his view
that all kinds of foreible self-help are
impermissible. One would expect him to
say that it de/illitely was illegal. lIe goes
on to express his dissatisfaction with
this conclusion in this very interesting
paragraph. "It seems clear that on the
doctrinal level Isruel is not entitled to
exercise a right of reprisal in modern
international law. Such clarity," he goes
on to say, "however, serves mainly to
discredit doctrinal approaches to legal
analysis." And not only in international
law, I might point out, but in other
areas of law as well. You just cannot
read the text isolated from the complexities of certain situations. He goes on to
say, "International society is not sufficiently organized to eliminate forcible
self-help in either its sanctioning or its
deterrent role. Therefore each reprisal
claim needs to he appraised by reference
to these two roles, namely sanctioning
and deterrence." At the end of the
article is listed a variety of criteria, and
he then says that even if these criteria
were being applied and even if there was
a right of reprisal in international law
which earlier he suggests there is not,
Israel would not have met the test
because its response was not proportional to the original wrong and because
there was no evidence that these people
who originally did the wrong to Israel
came from Lebanon. They may have
come from some other Arab country.
But the whole question is l{'ft open, I
~hink, at the end of the artide, and the
best I can do is to leave the question
open today. I stated the arguments on

both sides; 1 have indicated that there
has been a valid erosion away from the
original interpretation of the charter
that says reprisals are entirely out; and I
think perhaps we international lawyers
and Government officials are rethinking
the entire problem. There is a need,
perhaps, for some kind of reinstitution
of reprisal-if not in the most classical
sense, then in a more limited sense-as
some kind of sanctioning instrument
under international law_
Now, in the last third of my time, I'd
like to take up the other two topics,
which are interwoven. These arc intervention to protect nationals and intervention on humanitarian grounds. These
have been very topical things in recent
years, as you will see, and they arc going
to continue to he so. Now, insofar as
protection of nationals is concerned,
you recall that in today's reading there
is a mention of certain Navy Regulations. I am writing a Naval War College
International Law "Blue Book "-one of
the delightful obligations of the chairholder. I am writing it Qn this topic, and
when I started to write on this topic,
about three and a half years ago, there
was almost no writing on it at all. [f you
want to refer to the original interpretation of the United Nations Chartl'r or to
sonll! of thl' originul hooks, inili{'lIling
what customary law said, you could
refer hack to Westlake or Lawrence or
early Oppenheim, hut there is very
little information on what the situation
is today. Your present Navy Regulations
I wus able to trace in Washington back
to 1893. They are almost ill haec verba
now with what they were in 1893. Since
then we have had the Hague Conventions, the League of Nations, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the United
Nations Charter. I gently suggested that
it might be a good idea to reassess these
sections of the Navy RCj!ulations to see
wlH!ll\('r 11\(')' were in l'Onformily wilh
international law, and I WlIS lIs:;ured thllt
we alwuys hlld an on-going reassessment
of these regulations. In any event, they
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hear up fairly well, because tht'y wrre
obviou~lv drafted hy excdlt'nt lawyers
who put enough 'lIl~higuities into Lilem'
so that one could construe them in a
varirty of ways without doing too much
inju~tiee to tlwir original.
If you go back to the first instances
in \\'hieh the United States sought to
protect nationals by the use of contingents, ashore, you will find about I B8
eases in which these forces allegedly
protected the lives and the property of
Amcrican citizens, mostly in Latin
America but in the East and thc Near
East as well. It was dcemed to be
permissible under international law,
there was nothing wrong with this as
states could legally use forces to protect
the lives and property of their citizens
abroad. It was forcible self-help, but it
was a permissible sanction to protect
the human rights of your citizens, including their property rights. There was
no doubt that it was not deemed to be
intervention under customary international law. Even those people who said
it was intervention would then go on to
say it was permissible intervention because it was for a permissible purposl'.
Now the other concl'pt, humanitarian intervention, is slightly different.
Humanitarian intcrvl'ntion allows a state
or a I!roup of states to intt'rvcnc in a
country to protect not only its own
nationals, but also to protect nationals
of either third states or nationals of the
country in which the intervention is
made. For instance, the phrase was
always stated that if the treatmcnt of a
state to its nationals shocks the conscience of mankind, as did the treatment of thr Jews in Russia and various
Christians in Turkey during the last
ccntury, then generally the great powers
would mount some kind of expedition
that would inlen'ene and attempt to
bring an end to what they deemcd to he
a shocking violation of human rights.
Now note that here there is noL a
connection based upon nationality.
There is a connection here based upon

the need to protect individuals under a
certain international law standard. So
the doc-trine of humanitarian intervention goes beyond the protection of
nationals and actually protects not only
foreigners without a country, but also
the citizens of the country itself.
This is a difference not really in kind,
but a difference in approach. Generally,
humanitarian intervention was exercised
by a group of states and not a single
state as was generally the case in the
protection of nationals. Humanitarian
intervention was justificd on the ground
that although it obviously was an intt'rference with the sovereignty of the
invaded state, it was a permis$ihle one.
Sovereignty was not absolute, and whl'n
a state did reach this threshold of
shocking the conscience of mankind,
intervl'ntion was legal.
Now, whaL is Lhe impact of the
United Nations Charter on these two
doctrines? If one takes a look at the
discussions of the charter immediately
after its adoption in 1945, for instance
in Judge Jessup's excelJen t book, one
sees quitc clearly thaL the rhartt'r supplanted tht'$t~ individual measumsprotcelion of nationals all(1 humallitarian intcrvention which had hCl'n IIpproved hy customary internatiolllll law.
In othl'r words, tlH'Y Wl're 110 10111-(('\'
permissible. And 1Ilmost all of thc
writers concur in this. Some say it's very
douhtful whethcr it still exists. Bricrly,
for installee, very delicately says that it
is a delicate question. Thc Thomasrs,
who did an excellent study in the
Dominican Republic crisis, cannot effectively come to grips with the issue, but
they indicate that probably only nonforcible measures, in other words, not
actual force, could be used in the
situation to proll'ct humall ri~hls of
eitlwr nationals or in a hlllllanitllriall
context.
I do think here you have to reassess
the interpretation of the charter based
on the experience of the last 25 years.
You need not rely exclusively upon the
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charLcr. Jessup in his book adds n vcry
inLeresting cnvent which, I think, has
heen overlookrd by mnny pcoplc. In it
he affirmed that thcsc truditional docLrincs havc been replaced by thc charter,
hut he went on to say that if the
Security Council, wiLh its Military SLaff
CommiLLec, was unahle to act with the
requisiLe speed to prescrve life, then
forcible self-help might bc allowed.
And, of course, it is not a question of
their acting fast enough; they do not
have any conLingents, they arc not
established, and Lhey arc unlikely Lo aet
nt all. I L is not a question of rnpidiLy of
the acLion; it is n quesLion of getting
somc action initially.
It would be quite all right to forbid
foreiblc self-help under the charter
under the assumption, sueh as Jessup
was mnking, that the UniLed NaLions or
a regional organization such as the OAS
or the Organization of African Unity
had either estahlished collective machinery to handle these situations or
could act quickly on an ad hoc basis. As
a mattcr of fnct, we know that they
have not. Let me give you two c~
amples.
The first is Llw Congo ill 19M.. In Lhe
Congo siLunLion Lhere werc several thousand foreigncrs nnd Congolese captured
hy tlll~ (~izl'nga governnll'lIL. It wns, of
course, the rehl'l facLion LhnL renlly was
not a government in the legal sense, hut
it did occupy a porLion of the counLry
and was in rebellion ngainst thc cenLral
authority. These people were kept as
hostages. There was no doubt that this
constituLed a violaLion not only of the
United Nations Charter, but also of the
Geneva Conventions. No one really took
issue with that at all. Bul the United
Nations got boggrd down in debate
upon it. They finally decidcd to let the
OrganizaLion of African Unity attempt
to do :::ollwthing: they tried and werr
very, \'Cry uns\H'cl'ssful. Why :::hould
Gizenga. on hi::: last legs, givc up lhl'sr
hostages? He made the maximum propnganda use of them. There were

brondeasts indicating lhey would skin
Lhese peoplc alive nnd do all kinds of
other horrendous things unless pence
was made on his terms. These propaganda statements were not exaggeraLed,
for it was discovered later when the
United Nations did go into Stanleyville
that orders had been issued and were
outstanding to shoot the hostagcs if
Lhere was any bombing in the area. This
is a violation of in LcrnaLional law, to say
the least. As a result of lhis, the United
St.ltes, cooperating with Belgium and
Britain, mounted an airdrop which, as
you know, landed at Stanlcyville and
rescued thesc people. There was a tremendous sparing of life, and I think it is
reasonable to assume and reasonable to
conclude that this was a valid exercise,
at least in the classical sense, of humanitarian intervention.
As Professor Falk points out, this
really brought down the fury of the
radical African governments upon the
United States in the United Nations. In
fact, as a result, the United SLates took
a horrible propaganda beating. Professor
Schwebel, who was here last year, wa~
at the United Nations for the Unill'd
Statrs at that time, and Iw said Lhat the
United Stales, and AmLassador
Stcvenson in particular, was amazed at
this fad. I t was not coul'lll'cI in tl'ruli;
Lh'lt Lhis was a viola Lion of article 2(/1),
it was strictly on political lines, without
using legal argument except to the
exLenl Lhat the argument was macIc in
very general terms that the charter
forbids this type of humanitarian intervention at all.
Let me give you anothcr example.
This was the Dominican Republic in
1965. This is a lot more controversial, as
I am sure many of you realize, for a
variety of reasons. But at least initially,
in the perception of the U.S. Governmt'nt and, I think, rven the strongl'st
l'ritil':; of the AUll'ril'an al'lion, likl'
Profl':;:;or Falk or Profl~ssor Friedmann
of Columhia, the introduction of 400 or
500 marines into a crisis situation to
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gather, protect, and withdraw Amcrican
nationals, . and also the nationals of
other countries that wanted to be taken
out of the Dominican Republic, was
allegedly a valid act of protection of
nationals by the use of force overseas.
Cerlainly this was true under customary
international law. Whethcr it was true,
of course, under the United Nations
Charlcr and whether humanitarian intervention is valid under the charter gets us
into an entirely different game.
As in the case of reprisals, certain
things that were supposed to be set up
have not become effecLive, therefore we
find it necessary not to reinterpret
arbitrarily the provisions of the charter
but to read experience into it. I suppose, to some extent, it is like the
Supreme Court, which some people feel
is the Constitution by its interpretation.
It is perfectly permissible to amend the
charter by interpreting it differently,
depending upon the expectations of the
parties and the practice over the years.
The argument has been made that there
is no violation of the charter under
article 2(4) or in its humanitarian qr
protection of nationals provisions because what is forbidden is the usc or
threat of force that would impair the
territorial integrity or political indepcndt'nee of a t-'tate. Now in hoth tlw Conp;o
and the Dominican Hcpublic there was
certainly nothing that impaired the territorial integrity of the states involved.
The political independence of the state
was not directly affected in the Congo,
and, although the United States went on
to introduce additional troops, it was an
entirely different situation when we
kept staying in the Dominican Republic
under OAS authorization. At least initially, we were not attempting in any
way to interfere with the political independence of the state. In fact, we
werr trying to find some state with
whieh we {'ould dt'al. You could 1I1~o
read thig ap;ainst th,~ hroad"r interprdation. It is not necessary to take a narrow
reading of article 2(4). You can say that

this interpretation is eonsistent wiLh the
general principles of the charter. I
would say that the two big things in the
charter arc the prevention of aggressive
war and thc protection of human rights.
And, certainly, if a construction of one
section of the charter, namely article
2(4), will further human rights, it is a
proper construction. When I started out
doing this research, no one supported
this view. Since then I have found that
Professors Reisman and McDougal of
Yale now take this view. A thesis was
written by, surprisingly enough, a
Ncpalese graduate Imv student in
Canada last year who took this position,
and I think even Professor Falk and
some of the other critics of Amcrican
interventionary actions are taking it as
well. Now, if you can make a valid case
for the right of forcihle self-help in
these two instances-the protection of
nationals and humanitarian
intervention-then I think it becomes an
ohligation on the part of international
lawyers and the military. Let me say
that this is not something that is entirely abstract because, as I'm sure some of
you are aware, there will soon be
exactly the same situation in I1niti thnt
occurred in the Dominican Republic,
and the United States will suffer once
again an adverse political rt-action if we
tak,: illtcrvcntiollary lIctiOIl. There IIIlly
even be what you refer to as an OpOrder outstanding on this right now.
Nobody will tell me. In any event, this
type of thing will occur in the future, so
we are nol dealing only with the theoretical.
There are various criteria for such
interventions proposed by a Professor
Nanda in an article which he wrote
several years ago on the Dominican
Republic. For instancc, he says you
must have a spccific limited purpose
such as rescut'. YOil cannot inlt-rvene
h('('allst' till')' an- COllllllUllists or )'011
think they i1rc COllllllunists or you dn
not likr them or you wilnt to prolt-ct
your foreign investment. If possiLle,
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you should have an invitation by a
recognized government. If you have an
invitation, of course, it is not even a
question of intervention. Thirdly, he
refers to the limited duration of the
mission. You cannot intervene as we did
in Haiti in 1914 and stay 20 years-at
least not on the rationale of protection
of nationals. You also have to use a
limited amount of coercion. You don't
bring tanks into Santo Domingo if small
arms will do the job. And fifth, you
have to have no other recourse; it has to
be in extremis, and this, of course, is
pointed out quite correctly by your
Navy Regulations.
I have also attempted to set some
standards in my article and another
piece that also was puhlished this past
summer. Of the criteria that I have
stressed, one or two of them are variations on Professor Nanda's, but in addition to that, I have considered such
things as the immediacy of the violation
of human rights. Is a massacre really
imminent, or are rumors the only source
of information'~ For in~tance, the State
Department said in I C)();) that there was
blood flowing in the streets of Santo
Domingo. This was an accurate fOtatement hut in the general context in
which it was issued you were left with
the impres5ion that there wI're riVl'r5 of
blood: stall'ments were madl' ahout
heads heing cut off and put on pike::".
There was a lot of informal n:taliation
among the p,:ople in the Dominican
Republic, which was revealed by the
Inter-American Commission on lIuman
Ri{!hts in its investigations after I C)(iS. I
think, however, there is a 'luestion in
this instance ahout the immediacy of
the violation of human rights. I think
your Navy Itegulations indicate that it
has to be a very immediate and very
SI:VI:rc human rights violation to permit
this type of intervention.
I al:;o think that il cl'rlainly IlI'lp:; if
yoU ha\"(' an ill\'itation I'illll'r from till'
~""(Il!niz,'cl :rO\'l'rnml'nt or ill It'ast from
:;ome authority that appl'ars to haw a

reusonahll' lia'sifO for 1l1.lking the n:'lul'sl.
Once again, the intervenor mu::"t limit
the cOl'rcive measurl':; involved and must
also be relatively disintl'rested. Someone
in the Harvard Law Review suggested
that any state that has an interest in the
outcome should not be able to intervene. Well, if you intervene to protect
your nationals, how can you intervene
without an interest? In fact, some of the
leading advocates of the human rights
aspects have suggested that it is most
difficult to get people to express concern, particularly concern expressed in
action, because of human rights
deprivations in other countries, like the
situation in Biafra and the situation
several years ago in Indonesia. People
are only coneernc:d, unfortunately,
when they have some interest in it
themselves, and the interest, of course,
is generally based upon their own
nationals.
I think, in conclusion, that we can
see thut the Congo uirdrop was a classic
occasion of humanitarian intervention,
and the Dominican Republic, at least
initially, wa~ a classic ease of forl'ihle
~!'If-help. I think an argulllent can bl'
made: for the permissihility of hoth
these types of actions under the United
"Nations Charter. I think, in general, you
will find that as time passes, more and
more people will take a stand against an
absolute prohibition of the use of force
in international law in the situations
that I've been discussing today.
I'd like to close by recalling a lecture
given here 2 years ago by Professor
McDougal in which he, in effect, admitted that he had reconsidered some of his
earlier views. In particular, he said,
I am ashamed to confess that at
one time I lent my support to the
suggestion that article 2(4) and
the related articles did preclude
the use of self-help less than selfdefense. On reflection, [ think
that this was a very grave mistake,
that article 2(4) and article 51
must be interpreted differently.
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He goes on and lists his reasons, coming
to the conclusion that in the absence of
collective machinery to protect people
against attack and deprivation, in other
words in the absence of machinery as
noted by Judge Jessup many years ago,
the principle of major purposes requires
an interpretation which would honor
self-help against a prior unlawfulness.
The subsequent conduct of the parties to the U.N. Charter certainly confirms this. Many states of the world
have used force in situations short of
the requirements of self-defense to protect their national interests. That includes the United States, Great Britain,
Israel, and also many other countries. I
will just end with a conclusion: a

prohibition of violence is not an absolute virtue, for we may well want to use
violence with respect to Rhodesia, or we
may want to use violence with respect
to other areas of Southern Africa. As I
say, it is not an absolute virtue; it has to
be weighed against other values as well.
And this leads me to a statement hy
Secretary of State Dulles that he made
ahout 12 years ago. I disagreed with
him on many things, hut I do agree
with him on this statement. He said,
"Peace is a coin which has two sides;
one is the avoidance of the use of
force, and the other is the creation of
conditions of justice. In the long run,
you cannot expect one without the
other."
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